Phenomenology endorses a this-worldly conception of objectivity and reality and seeks to overcome the scepticism that argues that the way the world appears to us is compatible with the world being completely different (Husserl 1950/1999, p. 117; Heidegger 1986/1996, p.229). Phenomenology also rejects the view – currently endorsed by many naturalists – according to which natural science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not (see Stellars 1963, p.173). For phenomenology science is not simply a collection of systematically interrelated justified propositions. Science is performed by somebody; it is a specific theoretical stance towards the world. This stance did not fall down from the sky; it has its own presuppositions and origins. Scientific objectivity is something to strive for, but it rests on the observations of individual; it is knowledge shared by a community of experiencing subjects and presupposes a triangulation of points of view or perspectives.

dan zahavi & shaun gallagher

Zahavi, D., & Gallagher, S. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge.